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I.
INTRODUCTION
The earth has entered a new period of significant climate
change. While it has experienced many such periods in the past,
this episode is different because there is a connection to human
activities - specifically, anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse
gases. As a result of the human connection, some scientists are
now referring to this new geological period as the "Anthrocene
Age."
Since the early 1990s, the international community has been
working to mitigate climate change and its effects. Negotiations
* R. Bruce Townsend Professor of Law, Indiana University School of
Law-Indianapolis. I am grateful to Peter Grossman and Tom Schelling for their
comments and suggestions.
1. See, e.g., ANDREW REVKIN, GLOBAL WARMING: UNDERSTANDING THE FORE-
CAST 55 (1992). The most recent report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) concludes that anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases are
"very likely" responsible for "most of the observed increase in globally averaged
temperatures since the mid-20th century." Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change [hereinafter IPCC], Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis, Sum-
mary for Policymakers, Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment
on Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 10 (Feb. 2007), available at http://
www.ipcc.ch/SPM2febO7.pdf.
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have focused on reducing levels of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in
the atmosphere. That is the sole purpose of the Kyoto Protocol
to the Framework Convention on Climate Change,2 which calls
on developed countries (but not developing countries) to reduce
GHG emissions at least five percent below 1990 levels by the
year 2012.3 As the international community attempts to imple-
ment and enforce Kyoto, it bemoans the U.S.' failure to partici-
pate in the Treaty.4 Additionally, many climate scientists and
social scientists wonder whether Kyoto's targets are sufficient.5
Moreover, another vitally important component of the Frame-
work Convention has been largely neglected. That component is
adaptation. 6
This paper argues that greater attention to adaptation is
needed because mitigation efforts alone are unlikely to solve the
problems of climate change. Even in the unlikely circumstance
that a substantially strengthened version of the Kyoto Protocol
2. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9,1992, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter Framework Convention or
FCCC]; Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 32 (1998) [hereinafter Kyoto, Kyoto Protocol, or
Protocol]. The Framework Convention on Climate Change was opened for signa-
ture in New York in 1992, and entered into force in 1994. It has been signed and
ratified by 189 countries, including the U.S. The Kyoto Protocol to the Convention
was opened for signature in Kyoto, Japan in 1997, and entered into force in 2005. As
of the end of 2006, it had been ratified by 169 countries, not including the U.S.
3. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2, art. 3.1.
4. See, e.g., CNN.com, Dismay as U.S. Drops Climate Pact, Mar. 29, 2001, http://
archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLlI/europe/italy/O3/29/environment.kyoto/index.html.
The economist William Nordhaus estimates that lack of U.S. participation in the
Kyoto Protocol reduces the fraction of global emissions covered by Kyoto by ap-
proximately one-third. See William D. Nordhaus, Life After Kyoto: Alternative Ap-
proaches to Global Warming Policies 24 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper 11889, Dec. 2005), available at http://www.econ.yale.edu/-nordhaus/kyoto_-
long.-2005.pdf.
5. See, e.g., William K. Stevens, Experts Doubt Rise of Greenhouse Gas Will Be
Curtailed, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1997, at Al; CBCNews.com, Kyoto Protocol Not
Enough to Stop Warming, Nov. 10, 2004, http://www.cbc.ca/health/story/2004/11/09/
ACIA041109.html.
6. The Framework Convention's use of the terms "mitigation" and "adaptation"
is somewhat problematic. "Mitigation" is used to refer to efforts to reduce GHG
levels in the atmosphere, so as to minimize the extent of climate change. "Adapta-
tion" is used to refer to efforts to deal with whatever consequences occur. There is,
of course, substantial overlap between the two concepts. For example, if rising sea
levels due to climate change inundate some low-lying Pacific Island nations, moving
the populations to other islands may be the only realistic adaptation option. This
would, in a literal sense, mitigate the harm of climate change. But it would not be a
mitigation measure as contemplated in the FCCC. Despite potential interpretive
problems, this paper will participate in the now conventional usage of "mitigation"
and "adaptation."
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were fully implemented and enforced, global emissions of GHGs
almost certainly will rise at least in the short run, as emissions
from developing countries such as China and India are expected
to outpace any emissions reductions by developed countries. 7
Meanwhile, climate change is already occurring, 8 and its effects
are expected to grow more pronounced over the course of this
century.9 As a consequence, the costs of climate change are ex-
pected to rise, especially in the less-developed countries (LDCs)
of the world's tropical regions. 10 For those countries, adaptation
efforts are crucial.
Section I of this paper explains that the costs of climate change
will not be distributed uniformly, equitably, or randomly, but will
be most pronounced in regions of the world that can least afford
to bear them. Section II describes the international community's
general approach to adaptation in the Framework Convention on
Climate Change and subsequent negotiations. Section III fol-
lows Thomas Schelling's" lead in arguing that the best adapta-
tion policy LDCs can follow is to develop and diversify their
economies, and further argues that the world's developed coun-
tries should assist them (to the extent feasible) in the process of
building "adaptively efficient" institutions.12
7. See, e.g., Frank N. Laird, Just Say No to Greenhouse Gas Emissions Targets,
ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH., Winter 2000, available at http://www.issues.org/17.2/laird.
htm. China is expected to overtake the U.S. as the world leader in GHG emissions
within the next decade. See Anti-hero, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 9, 2006, at 18; Keith
Bradsher, China to Pass U.S. in 2009 in Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2006, at C1.
8. According to the latest IPCC report, supra note 1, at 5, "warming of the cli-
mate system is unequivocal, and is now evident from observations of increases in
global average air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice, and
rising global mean sea level."
9. The IPCC projects that during the course of the twenty-first century, rising
mean global temperatures will bring about the following effects (among others):
snow cover will contract, sea ice will shrink, sea levels will rise, and extreme weather
events, including droughts and floods, will become more frequent. Id. at 16.
10. See, e.g., Richard S.J. Tol, Why Worry About Climate Change? A Research
Agenda, NOTA Di LAVORO 136.2006 (Nov. 2006); see also Mendelsohn et al., infra
note 17 and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., THOMAS C. SCHELLING, STRATEGIES OF COMMITMENT AND OTHER
ESSAYS ch. 2 (2006).
12. DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECO-
NOMIC PERFORMANCE 80-82 (1990).
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II.
THE COSTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE
The costs of climate change are expected to rise during the
course of this century, but these costs will not be distributed uni-
formly or equitably. They will be most severe for the countries
that can least afford them - the less-developed countries (LDCs)
of the world's tropical regions, where higher mean temperatures
and coastal flooding will have costly and potentially catastrophic
effects on human life and social welfare.' 3
In relatively rich and well-developed countries like the U.S.,
which emit the most GHGs, climate change may significantly im-
pact coastal regions and impose other costs amounting perhaps
to two or three percent of gross domestic product (GDP).14
However, climate change will not likely constitute a major threat
to the overall economy, our government institutions, or our lives.
Our existing government and market institutions are diversified,
robust and adaptable; our technological capabilities are superior;
and our economic ability to absorb exogenous shocks to the sys-
tem is well tested. Although we do not always respond well to
environmental crises like Hurricane Katrina, our failures are
more a matter of political will (in both planning and response)
than a lack of resources or incapability of national institutions.
As Professor Schelling notes, even if the climate changes signifi-
cantly, the U.S. will still be able to manufacture automobiles, re-
fine oil, perform open-heart surgery, produce pharmaceuticals,
13. See, e.g., id. at 34-35; Tol, supra note 10. For introductions to the concepts of
adaptation and adaptive capacity, including how the concepts are used in the climate
change literature, see generally B. Smit & J. Wandel, Adaptation, Adaptive Capacity
and Vulnerability, 16 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 282 (2006); G.W. Yohe & R.S.J. Tol,
Indicators for Social and Economic Coping Capacity - Moving Towards a Working
Definition of Adaptive Capacity, 12 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 25 (2002).
14. See WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS & JOSEPH BOYER, WARMING THE WORLD: Eco-
NOMIC MODELS OF GLOBAL WARMING 91, Table 4.10 (2000) (estimating that a 2.5°C
increase in global mean temperatures would cost European members of the OECD,
on average, 2.83% of GDP). For the United States, the economist William
Nordhaus, in the early 1990s, estimated that climate change would cost between
0.25% and 1% of annual national income. William D. Nordhaus, To Slow or Not To
Slow: The Economics of the Greenhouse Effect, 101 ECON. J. 920, 933 (1991). Ten
years later, Nordhaus and co-author Joseph Boyer, supra this note at 97, conclude
that climate change will cost the US economy approximately 0.5% of annual na-
tional income. Most recently, Nordhaus, using a different model, has received his
cost estimate upward to between 0.9% and 1.7% of annual national income. To put
these numbers in some context, the First Persian Gulf War (1990-91) cost the US
economy an estimated 1% of annual GDP. See William D. Nordhaus, The Eco-
nomic Consequences of a War with Iraq, in C. KEYSEN ET AL, eds., War with Iraq:
Costs, Consequences, and Alternatives 51, 55 tbl. 2 (2002).
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and do millions of other jobs that are, at least relatively speaking,
climate insensitive.1 5
The point here is not to downplay the effects of climate change
on the American economy. Even if the costs are not destabi-
lizing, they will likely be significant enough to require or justify
some amount of adaptation or mitigation. Moreover, the distri-
bution of climate change costs will not be uniform across the
country. The expected costs of climate change in Indiana are al-
most certainly much lower than the expected costs in a state like
Florida, where rising sea levels are likely to inundate vast coastal
areas.
The effects of climate change in the U.S. are not likely to be
nearly as destabilizing as in the world's poorer countries. These
countries emit very few GHGs, but they are far more vulnerable
to climactic impacts on health, resources, and economic produc-
tion because they lack diversified economies and "adaptively ef-
ficient" institutions. They rely predominantly on agricultural or
other resource-based industries like tourism or fishing, all of
which are highly climate-sensitive. This is especially true for
poor countries in warmer climates, where the marginal effects of
additional heating are likely to be greater. 16 Simply put, these
countries could not, at present, afford the costs of climate
change.'7
III.
ADAPTATION PROVISIONS OF THE FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE
The 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC)
acknowledges that adaptation is both necessary and problematic.
Several of the Convention's provisions address adaptation. For
example, Article IV requires all parties to "cooperate in prepar-
ing for adaptation to the impacts of climate change," and obli-
gates developed countries to provide financial and technological
assistance to LDCs for purposes of adaptation. 18 The FCCC
notes that climate change poses special risks for low-lying coastal
15. SCHELLING, supra note 11, at 34.
16. See Tol, supra note 10.
17. For a quantitative assessment of the distribution of climate change costs be-
tween "rich" and "poor" countries, see Robert Mendelsohn, Ariel Dinar, & Larry
Williams, The Distributional Impact of Climate Change on Rich and Poor Countries,
11 ENrv. & DEv. ECON. 159 (2006).
18. FCCC, supra note 2, at Art. IV.
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areas, fragile ecosystems, arid and semi-arid regions, and areas
that are subject to drought and desertification or prone to natural
disasters.1 9
Another adaptation provision (Art. III, § 5) calls for broader
development assistance as an adaptation strategy: "the parties...
should promote ... sustainable economic growth and develop-
ment in... developing country Parties, thus enabling them better
to address the problems of climate change. 20
Since the early 1990s, the international community's attention
has focused mainly on mitigation efforts under the Kyoto Proto-
col. But, there has been some limited progress under the adapta-
tion provisions of the FCCC. In 2001, the FCCC parties agreed
to establish three funds: the Special Climate Change Fund, the
Least Developed Countries Fund, and the Adaptation Fund.
The combined purpose of these funds is to assist developing
countries with technology transfers, capacity building, adaptation
planning, and other needs. Although some contributions to the
funds have been pledged, as of 2004 none of these funds were
operational.21 Aside from establishing assistance funds, the par-
ties met at Buenos Aires in 2004 to prepare "a program of work
on adaptation and response measures," and announced a deci-
sion to promote "capacity-building" in LDC parties.22 Addition-
ally, two other meetings have been held at Tehran and Bonn
pursuant to the broader development assistance mandate from
Art. III, § 5. These meetings focused on economic diversification
in LDCs in recognition of the over-dependence of many LDC
economies on sectors that could be negatively affected by climate
change, including agriculture, tourism, and fishing. 23 Efforts to
diversify LDC economies are consistent both with Doug North's
19. Id.
20. Id. at Art. III, §5.
21. THOMAS A. HELLER & P.R. SHUKLA, PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE, BEYOND KYOTO: ADVANCING THE INTERNATIONAL EFFORT AGAINST CLI-
MATE CHANGE 111 (DEC. 2003).
22. See Buenos Aires Programme of Work on Adaptation and Response Mea-
sures, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change [hereinafter
UNFCC], Decision 1/CP.10, at 2, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2004/10/Add.1 (Dec. 18,
2004), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/coplO/lOaOl.pdf; Capacity Building
for Developing Countries, UNFCC, Decision 2/CP.10, at 7, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/
2004/10/Add.1 (Dec. 18, 2004), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/copl/10a
01.pdf.
23. See Implementation of Article 4, Paragraphs 8 and 9, of the Convention,
UNFCC Decision 5/CP.7, at 5, available at http://unfccc.int/files/cooperation and_
support/ldclapplication/pdf/13a01p32.pdf
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focus on "adaptive efficiency" for long-run economic growth and
Tom Schelling's call to promote economic development in LDCs
for purposes of climate change adaptation. The next section
highlights the significance of North's and Schelling's work for cli-
mate change adaptation.
IV.
DEVELOPING "ADAPTIVE EFFICIENCY" IN LDCS
A. What the LDCs Should Do
Professor Schelling has been studying both the science and the
social-science of climate change since the mid-1970s. He theo-
rized that LDCs can best assist global efforts to deal with climate
change by developing their economies and increasing per capita
income. 24 In contrast to many of his fellow economists, 25 Schel-
ling believes that the Kyoto Protocol rightly imposed GHG miti-
gation burdens on developed countries instead of the developing
countries that will bear the bulk of the effects of climate change.
According to Professor Schelling, the LDCs' best "adaptation"
strategy is to develop their economies because the wealthier they
become, the greater their capacity to adapt to climate change.
The implicit, seemingly inarguable presumption is that per capita
income is among the most important indicators of a county's rel-
ative susceptibility or adaptability to climate change.
The problem, of course, is that economic development can be
an elusive goal. Certainly, it has eluded many of the world's
LDCs up until now. In large part, this is because they lack the
kind of "adaptively efficient" institutions that the economic his-
torian Douglass North claims are necessary for long-run eco-
nomic growth. In his 1973 book, The Rise of the Western World:
A New Economic History, North and co-author Robert Paul
Thomas noted that long-run economic growth has been the ex-
ception, not the rule, in world history. For a wide variety of rea-
sons, ranging from inefficient social norms to interest-group
politics and path dependency, most polities have found it exceed-
24. SCHELLING, supra note 11, at 35.
25. See, e.g., Joseph E. Aldy, Scott Barrett & Robert Stavins, Thirteen Plus One:
A Comparison of Global Climate Policy Architectures, Nota di Lavoro 64.2003 (July
2003) (arguing for global participation in GHG mitigation efforts); Sheila M. Olim-
stead & Robert Stavins, An International Policy Architecture for the Post-Kyoto
Era, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies Related Publication 06-03
(Jan. 2006).
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ingly difficult to establish and maintain the kinds of "adaptively
efficient" institutions needed to produce long-run growth.26
In his 1990 book, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Eco-
nomic Performance, Professor North defined "adaptive effi-
ciency" according to the following characteristics: (1) an
institutional and organizational structure that encourages eco-
nomic experimentation and innovation; (2) decentralized deci-
sion-making processes; (3) rules that encourage the use of tacit
knowledge and entrepreneurial habits; and (4) well-specified and
consistent "rules of the game," including legal rules to ensure the
reliability of contracts and property rights, efficient bankruptcy
laws, transparent rule-making procedures, a fair tax system, and
non-corrupt governmental organizations, including courts. 27
These are essential ingredients for long-run economic growth in a
world subject to random exogenous shocks, including changing
environmental conditions. Importantly, they are ingredients that
are in short supply among the world's LDCs and inculcating
them is more easily said than done.2 8
Some exogenous shocks can be of such great magnitude that
the quality of institutions would matter little. For instance,
should a large asteroid suddenly and unexpectedly strike the
earth, no country's institutional structure would be resilient and
robust enough to maintain the well-being of its citizens.29 Social
welfare would surely decline, perhaps to zero (denoting the ter-
mination of human life on earth). But, most scientists do not
expect climate change to be like a large, sudden, and unexpected
asteroid strike; they believe that mitigation and adaptation are
both possible.30 If they are wrong, and the effects of climate are
both inevitable and overwhelming, then there is little point in ar-
26. DOUGLASS C. NORTH & ROBERT PAUL THOMAS, THE RISE OF THE WEST-
ERN WORLD: A NEW ECONOMIc HISTORY (1973).
27. NORTH, supra note 12, at 81-2.
28. Indeed, in his 1993 Noble Prize address, North asserted that the development
of adaptively efficient institutions has been a long-term, gradual process. "We do not
know how to create adaptively efficiency in the short run." Douglass C. North, Eco-
nomic Performance Through Time (Dec. 9, 1993), http://nobelprize.org/nobel-prizes/
economics/laureates/1993/north-lecture.html.
29. Institutions would matter, however, if the asteroid were identified early
enough to, say, affect its trajectory to avoid the collision. They would also matter
should a smaller asteroid (e.g., one large enough to cause great harm, but not eradi-
cate human existence) strike the earth. See Scott Barrett, The Problem of Averting
Global Catastrophe, 6 CHI. J. INT'L L. 527, 534-9 (2006).
30. See SCHELLING, supra note 11, at 41 (noting that "[c]omprehensive estimates
of climate change are invariably gradual").
2008] CLIMATE CHANGE, ADAPTATION, DEVELOPMENT 9
guing about what should be done. In this respect, all scientists,
scholars, policy analysts and government officials who are partici-
pating in climate-change policy debates are, at least relatively
speaking, climate optimists. 31
V.
HOW THE DEVELOPED WORLD CAN HELP
A. Problems and Prospects of Foreign Aid
The LDCs are unlikely to be able to develop the kind of adap-
tively efficient institutions needed to cope with significant cli-
mate change on their own. They are going to require assistance
from the developed world.
One obvious way the developed world can help reduce adapta-
tion costs for LDCs is by mitigating their GHG emissions. If, by
reducing GHG emissions, the parties to the Kyoto Protocol could
reduce the extent of expected climate change by one to two de-
grees Celsius, expected adaptation costs borne predominantly by
LDCs could be significantly reduced.32 However, substantial sci-
entific uncertainty persists about relations between GHG levels
in the atmosphere, global mean temperatures, and the expected
costs of temperature increases in different locations. In other
words, it is difficult to estimate how much LDCs might save in
adaptation costs over the next fifty to one hundred years from
various levels of GHG mitigation by developed countries.
Beyond mitigation, developed countries can more directly as-
sist LDC adaptation efforts by providing funding, technology
transfers, and foreign direct investment aimed at either discrete
adaptation projects or more general development assistance. As
we have seen, the Framework Convention on Climate Change
obligates developed country parties to provide this kind of adap-
tation assistance to developing country parties. But, the FCCC
is short on specifics and fails to recognize significant obstacles to
adaptation assistance. These are the same obstacles that have af-
31. As R.B. Alley and co-authors have noted, "abrupt climate changes have oc-
curred repeatedly throughout the geological record." R.B. Alley et al., Abrupt Cli-
mate Change, 299 Sci. 2005 (Mar. 28, 2003). And as Scott Barrett (among others)
notes, "[a]brupt climate change could precipitate a catastrophe." Aldy, Barrett &
Stavins, supra note 25, at 546.
32. As Thomas Schelling has written, climate change mitigation by developed
countries is in the nature of foreign aid to LDCs, which would be the primary bene-
ficiaries of those mitigation efforts. Thomas C. Schelling, The Costs of Combating
Global Warming: Facing the Tradeoffs, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 8 (1997).
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flicted developed country efforts to provide foreign aid (and
other forms of development assistance) since the middle of the
twentieth century.
While the history of development assistance since the end of
World War II is a mixed bag of notable successes and more fre-
quent failures, Tom Schelling has argued in favor of something
like a Marshall Plan to assist LDCs with climate change adapta-
tion.33 Under the Plan, the U.S. provided $13.2 billion to rebuild
the ravaged economies and polities of Europe following World
War 11. 34 The Marshall Plan was not just a matter of funding
reconstruction projects, nor was the goal of the Plan simply to
stimulate economic growth, as some have argued.35 Rather, the
Plan was intended to create modern, representative democracies
and "mixed economies" in Western Europe. More specifically,
the Marshall Plan promoted institutional structures that would
ensure free (but not unregulated) markets, free trade, popular
sovereignty, and financial stability. It did so by successfully con-
ditioning funding on structural adjustments and by promoting
European economic integration.36
However, the Marshall Plan may not be the best analogy for
climate change adaptation efforts. The Plan was limited to a
group of countries in a single region of the world that had many
shared historical experiences and several formal and informal in-
stitutions in common. All had been through the Renaissance, the
Reformation, the Industrial Revolution, and two world wars
fought on their continent. Despite important differences in lan-
guage, culture, and traditions, the citizens of England, France,
and Germany had what Denzau and North have referred to as
"shared mental models" about the world.37 Under the historical
33. See Thomas C. Schelling, What Makes Greenhouse Sense?, 81 FOREIGN AFF.
2-9 (2002). Schelling cut his teeth as a young economist working on the Marshall
Plan, first in Washington and later in the Copenhagen field office and Paris
headquarters.
34. See J. BRADFORD DELONG & BARRY EICHENGREEN, The Marshall Plan: His-
tory's Most Successful Structural Adjustment Program, in POSTWAR ECONOMIC RE-
CONSTRUCTION AND LESSONS FOR THE EAST TODAY 189, 196 (R. Dornbusch, W.
NOlling, & R. Layard eds., 1991).
35. See ALAN S. MILWARD, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF WESTERN EUROPE 1945-
51 (1984) (noting that the Marshall Plan did not provide enough aid to make much
of a difference for European country growth rates).
36. See DELONG & EICHENGREEN, supra note 34.
37. Arthur T. Denzau & Douglass C. North, Shared Mental Models: Ideologies
and Institutions, 47 KYKLOS 3 (1994).
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and institutional circumstances, the structural adjustments re-
quired by the Marshall Plan were incremental, not radical.
Promoting institutional change and economic development has
not proven nearly as easy in other parts of the world where cul-
tures, social norms, and mental models are very different from
our own. Prompted in part by the success of the Marshall Plan,
the U.S. and multinational institutions including the World Bank
and International Monetary Fund (IMF) have attempted to pro-
mote institutional change through structural adjustment and eco-
nomic development in many underdeveloped countries of the
world. However the success has been limited and the reputation
of foreign aid has suffered mightily, as billions of dollars have
been wasted on ineffective projects and corrupt regimes in Af-
rica, Latin America, and elsewhere.38 Critics such as Milton
Friedman and Peter Bauer have complained that foreign aid has
"enlarged government bureaucracies, perpetuated bad govern-
ments, enriched the elite in poor countries, or just been
wasted. '39 Their claims are supported by a good deal of empiri-
cal evidence, including evidence that "conditionality" - requiring
reforms as a precondition for receiving aid - often does not work
because of donee resistance to reforms and donor reluctance to
cut off aid.40 Despite receiving millions of dollars in foreign aid,
per capita income in African countries has actually declined.41
Not all foreign aid has been wasted, however. As Nicholas
Kristof points out, "many of the people you meet in any African
village are alive because of foreign aid."'42 Steven Radelet notes
38. See generally WILLIAM EASTERLY, THE WHITE MAN'S BURDEN: WHY THE
WEST'S EFFORTS TO AID THE REST HAVE DONE SO MUCH ILL AND So LITTLE
GOOD (2006).
39. Steven Radelet, A Primer on Foreign Aid (Center for Global Development,
Working Paper No. 92, 2006). See PETER BAUER, DISSENT ON DEVELOPMENT:
STUDIES AND DEBATES IN DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS (1971); MILTON FRIEDMAN,
Foreign Economic Aid: Means and Objectives, in ESSAYS IN PUBLIC POLICY, vol. 60
(Hoover Institution, 1995).
40. See, e.g., EASTERLY, supra note 38; Radelet, supra note 39, at 13.
41. See EASTERLY, supra note 38, at 46 fig. 2. This is not to say that foreign aid
actually caused the decline in per capita income, although some observers argue that
aid programs are more likely to obstruct than promote development. See, e.g., Peter
Bauer & Basil Yamey, Again Foreign Aid, Econ. Notes No. 23 (1989), available at
http://www.libertarian.co.uk/lapubs/econn/econn023.pdf. David Osterfeld, The Fail-
ures and Fallacies of Foreign Aid, 40 THE FREEMAN (Feb. 1990), available at http://
www.fee.org/publications/the-freeman/article.asp?aid=560 (claiming that foreign aid
has led to the "pauperization" in developing countries).
42. Nicholas Kristof, Aid: Can it Work?, 53 N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Oct. 5, 2006) (re-
viewing WILLIAM EASTERLY, THE WHITE MAN'S BURDEN: WHY THE WEST'S EF-
FORTS TO AID THE REST HAVE DONE So MUCH ILL AND So LrrrLE GOOD (2006)).
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that most empirical studies of the effects of foreign aid since 1990
have found positive correlations with public health and economic
growth. 43 William Easterly agrees that "foreign aid likely con-
tributed to . . . dramatic improvements in health and education
indicators in poor countries." Indeed, Easterly confirms, during
the last four decades, life expectancy in the "typical poor counr
try" has risen by twenty years, infant mortality has declined from
131 per 1,000 babies to only 36 per 1,000 babies, and the percent-
age of children enrolled in primary school rose from 65 to 100. 44
Despite being a staunch critic of traditional forms of foreign aid,
Easterly would not end all such aid, but would instead "put the
focus back where it belongs: get the poorest people of the world
such obvious goods as the vaccines, the antibiotics, the food sup-
plements, the improved seeds, the fertilizer, the roads, the
boreholes, the water pipes, the textbooks, and the nurses. '45
Foreign aid programs can achieve remarkable success in very
short periods of time if they are well-conceived and targeted, as
suggested by Easterly. Most recently, a vaccination campaign
spearheaded by the American Red Cross, the U.S. Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, the United Nations Foundation,
and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), cut the
measles rate in Africa by 75 percent in just six years.46 Such aid
efforts may or may not directly relate to climate change adapta-
tion. Warmer mean temperatures are expected to increase the
global incidence of malaria, among other vector-borne diseases.
Therefore, foreign aid targeted at reducing the rate of malaria
infection and successfully treating the disease bears a direct con-
nection to climate change. Other forms of foreign assistance,
such as micro-credit - small, uncollateralized loans for small busi-
ness enterprises - would have no direct bearing on climate
change adaptation, but might help to offset some of the expected
costs of climate change by raising living standards.47
43. Radelet, supra note 39, at 15-16.
44. EASTERLY, supra note 38, at 176.
45. Id. at 368-69. For more on foreign aid successes, see, e.g., RUTH LEVINE ET
AL., Millions Saved: Proven Successes in Global Health (2004); JEFFREY D. SACHS,
THE END OF POVERTY: ECONOMIC POSSIBILITIES OF OUR TIME (2006).
46. See http://www.measlesinitiative.org/index3.asp; Margaret Chan, Defeating
Measles, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 18, 2007, at 7.
47. See SCHELLING, supra note 11, at 36 (noting how assistance aimed at improv-
ing public health in developing countries "can significantly offset the adverse effects
of climate change").
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Another issue is whether foreign aid can happen quickly
enough to generate the kinds of institutional developments that
increase adaptive efficiency. According to Schelling's esti-
mates,48 the effects of climate change will become significant
over the next fifty to seventy-five years. This seems precious lit-
tle time in which to cultivate diversified, robust, and resilient
market and government institutions in countries that have never
had them before. Consider, for example, the plight of millions of
Bangladeshis currently employed in subsistence agriculture on
low-lying lands along the Bay of Bengal, which will likely be in-
undated before the end of this century. 49 According to a report
by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD), a one meter rise in sea level would inundate 18
percent of Bangladesh's total land area, and displace 11 percent
of its population (about thirteen million people). Creating alter-
native employment opportunities within a few short decades for
those millions in Dhaka and other cities, which sit on higher
ground, will be no easy feat. As noted earlier,50 Professor North
believes that we do not yet know how to introduce adaptively
efficient institutions in the short run. That may be true, but we
have had at least some success in promoting adaptive efficiency
changes in the past.
The Marshall Plan achieved important structural adjustments
in Western European economies within a single generation.
Since then, several countries, including Singapore and Korea,
achieved first-world economic status within a few decades (and
without much in the way of direct foreign aid). Today, given the
expected costs of climate change, LDCs should at least have
some incentive to make whatever structural adjustments are nec-
essary for successful adaptation. 51 Development assistance that
48. Id. at 33 ("Climate change may become serious, if little or nothing is done
about it, in the second half of this century and, even if substantial mitigating efforts
are undertaken, toward the end of the century.").
49. Shardul Agrawala et al., Organization for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment, Development and Climate Change in Bangladesh: Focus on Coastal Flood-
ing and the Sundarbans, Environment Directorate and Development Co-operation
Directorate (2003), available at http://www.oecd.orgdataoecd/46155/21055658.pdf.
50. See North, supra note 28.
51. HELLER & SHUKLA, supra note 21, at 119, caution that "[e]ven though the
threat of climate-induced damage is most severe in developing nations, political ac-
tors concentrate on immediate issues like local air and water pollution that may help
them claim public resources and satisfy popular expectations, rather than on long-
term, invisible concerns like climate change." That might be true, but it could also
be true that reducing local air and water pollution would enhance social welfare
more than specific climate change-related projects. After all, we would not expect
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is appropriately targeted, tailored, and conditional might work -
subject, of course, to persistent obstacles such as inefficient social
norms and institutional path dependencies. This is not to say that
all of the world's economies are likely to attain first-world status
by the end of the present century, but something clearly needs to
be done to help LDCs adapt to climate change and there have
been some development success stories to give us hope that ad-
aptation assistance has the potential to be truly helpful.
The final and perhaps easiest issue for climate change adapta-
tion assistance is how to pay for it. The obvious solution is to
impose a tax on either the carbon content of inputs or on emis-
sions. The revenues generated by such a tax could be devoted to
international aid efforts to assist developing country efforts to
create adaptively efficient market and government institutions.
However, taxes are politically unpopular in many countries, in-
cluding the U.S. Moreover, introducing a scheme of emissions
taxes would require a major shift away from tradeable permit-
ting, which has been the mitigation instrument of choice under
the Kyoto Protocol.
During the negotiations that resulted in the Kyoto Protocol,
the U.S. pushed for tradeable permitting based on its successful
experiment with that tool in the acid rain program of the 1990
Clean Air Act Amendments. 52 The chief virtue of tradeable per-
mitting (as opposed to traditional, non-tradeable quotas) is that
it minimizes compliance costs for industry. And, in contrast to
tax-based approaches to pollution control, tradeable permitting
is not politically unpopular. On the contrary, it is currently the
en vogue solution for many environmental problems.53
Nevertheless, several prominent economists, including William
Nordhaus, have long advocated carbon taxes as the best overall
future damage from climate change damage to figure prominently in the welfare
functions of thousands (or millions) of individuals threatened by dysentery from un-
sanitary water supplies. On one point, however, Heller and Shukla are undeniably
correct: "Climate-related policies.., are most likely to draw political support within
developing countries when they piggyback on and enhance more salient develop-
ment priorities." Id. at 126.
52. 42 U.S.C. § 7651 (1990). See, e.g., A. DENNY ELLERMAN ET AL., MARKETS
FOR CLEAN AIR: THE U.S. ACID RAIN PROGRAM (2001); DANIEL H. COLE, POLLU-
TION & PROPERTY: COMPARING OWNERSHIP INSTITUTIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION 51-57 (2002).
53. On the proliferation of tradable permitting programs since 1990, see id. at 57-
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approach to mitigating GHG emissions. 54 Emissions taxes have
various advantages over tradeable permits including the prospect
of a "double dividend. '55 The taxes would create incentives for
pollution sources to reduce emissions and provide revenues that
governments could then invest in climate change mitigation and
adaptation projects. 56 In addition, by increasing the cost of using
conventional carbon-based technologies, such as gasoline, a car-
bon tax would increase incentives for innovating cleaner substi-
tute fuels. 57
B. Technological Innovation and Transfer
Another way the developed world might help reduce or offset
climate change adaptation costs in LDCs is by innovating and
transferring new mitigation and adaptation technologies. There
is every reason to expect that technological innovations will
emerge over the next several decades that will reduce the costs of
mitigation and adaptation. Professor Schelling notes that sev-
enty-five years ago, "we didn't have nuclear energy, antibiotics,
genetics, satellites or even plastics."' 58 What technological mar-
vels do the next seventy-five years hold in store? It is worth not-
ing that we have only considered climate change as a potential
problem for the last thirty years and we have just begun the
search for solutions.59
One potentially useful technological innovation to ameliorate
climate change is coal gasification, which can make the energy
produced from coal virtually carbon-free. This is not a fanciful
54. Nordhaus, supra note 4. See also William A. Pizer, Choosing Price or Quan-
tity Controls for Greenhouse Gases, in THE RFF GUIDE TO CLIMATE CHANGE Eco-
NOMICS AND POLICY 46 (2003).
55. Michael Porter, America's Green Strategy, 264 Sci. AMER. 96 (1991)
56. Because a carbon tax would be regressive - the tax would fall most heavily on
poorer individuals - at least some of the revenues from a carbon tax should replace
or provide credits for existing taxes (e.g., on income).
57. See, e.g., RUUD A. DE MooiJ, ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION AND THE DOUBLE
DIVIDEND (2000); Ian W.H. Parry & Antonio M. Bento, Tax Deductions, Environ-
mental Policy, and the "Double Dividend" Hypothesis (World Bank Policy Research,
Working Paper No. 2119, 1999); CRAIG HANSON & DAVID SANDALOW, GREENING
THE TAX CODE (2006); David Pearce, The Role of Carbon Taxes in Adjusting to
Global Warming, 101 ECON. J. 938 (1991).
58. SCHELLING, supra note 11, at 46.
59. Those solutions will certainly include "geo-engineering," a term with ominous
connotations, but which denotes uncontroversial measures, such as afforestation to
absorb more carbon dioxide, as well as more controversial (potential) measures such
as introducing more aerosols in the upper atmosphere to reflect more sunlight. See,
e.g., SCHELLING, supra note 11, ch. 3.
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new process; the technology has been around since the first half
of the twentieth century. The coal is converted to gas by heating
it with oxygen to over 2,000 degrees Fahrenheit in a pressurized
chamber. After the coal has been gasified, carbon dioxide, as
well as hazardous pollutants like mercury, is relatively easy to
separate and remove. Unfortunately, the technology is not yet
cost-effective. At current prices, building an "integrated gasifica-
tion combined cycle" power plant is estimated to cost ten to
twenty percent more than a conventional coal-fired power plant,
not including costs of sequestering carbon removed from the
coal. 60 Moreover, carbon sequestration technologies are still un-
proven. 61 With further technological refinements or changes in
the relative prices of other energy sources, 62 gasified coal could
become a cost-effective alternative fuel source.
Although nothing guarantees that favorable technological re-
finements will occur, innovation is not purely serendipitous.
Given a proper structure of incentives for innovators (e.g., intel-
lectual property rights that allow them to internalize a sufficient
amount of the benefits from innovation), there is no particular
reason to believe that favorable, cost-reducing technological in-
novations will not occur. If not coal gasification, then perhaps
fuel cells, fusion reaction, or some other breakthrough. 63
If and when technological changes arrive, diffusion can be
rapid. Jeremy Rifkin notes that the first gasoline station opened
in Detroit in 1911 and, only nineteen years later, the U.S. had
more than twenty-one million cars.64 Importantly, the U.S. has
institutional structures and a commercial culture to facilitate the
rapid development and diffusion of new technologies. Other cul-
60. See, e.g., Christopher Swope, Coal Converts, GOVERNING (Apr. 2006), availa-
ble at http://www.governing.com/articles/4coal.htm.
61. China, which happens to be among the world leaders in coal gasification tech-
nology, has been experimenting with "in situ" gasification, where the coal is gasified
while still underground, presumably solving the sequestration problem. Then the
biggest problem is to capture and store the gas fuel produced. Peter Fairley, Part I:
China's Coal Future, TECH. REV., Jan. 4, 2007, available at http://www.technology
review.com/Energy/17963/.
62. One obvious way to encourage efforts to innovate new, cleaner energy tech-
nologies is to make existing, dirtier energy sources more expensive to use, e.g., by
imposing Pigouvian taxes. The single greatest impediment to technological change in
the energy section may be the relatively low prices of oil and coal.
63. See Scott Barrett, Climate Treaties and "Breakthrough" Technologies, 96 AM.
ECON. REV. 22 (2006) (discussing the role of technological innovation in climate
change).
64. JEREMY RIFKIN, THE HYDROGEN ECONOMY: THE CREATION OF THE WORLD-
WIDE ENERGY WEB AND THE REDISTRIBUTION OF POWER ON EARTH 72 (2002).
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tures and institution sets may not be so innovation-friendly. For
example, before the fall of the communism in Europe, the social-
ist economies of Eastern Europe produced far fewer technologi-
cal innovations, and were far slower to adopt efficiency-
enhancing innovations than the market-based economies of
Western Europe.65 It can be a struggle to get even generally
available technologies to all the places where they may be




Finally, there is reason for both optimism and pessimism about
climate change in the twenty-first century. The bad news begins,
of course, with the brute fact of climate change and the social
costs it will likely entail. Those costs are already being felt, and
they will multiply during the course of this century. Meanwhile,
the near-term prospect for meaningful action on climate change
appears bleak. The parties to the Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change and the Kyoto Protocol seem far more interested in
minimizing regulatory compliance costs for regulated industries
than in actually reducing carbon emissions or assisting LDCs
with the consequences of climate change. If the LDCs do not
soon begin paying more attention to the issue of adaptation,
those consequences could be severe.
The best climate change policy for the LDCs is to raise their
per capita income by diversifying their economies and building
more adaptively efficient institutions. As they grow wealthier,
their capacity to adapt to the effects of climate change will in-
crease. However, there is no certain formula for increasing per
capita income and inculcating adaptively efficient institutions in
LDCs. For many, if not most, of the countries, the process will
require substantial international assistance, which so far has not
been forthcoming.
To end on a more optimistic note, developed countries cer-
tainly have the capability to both mitigate a significant percent-
age of their GHG emissions at reasonably low cost and assist
LDCs with adapting to changing environmental circumstances by
65. See JANOS KORNAI, THE SOCIALIST SYSTEM: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
COMMUNISM 292-301 (1992) (regarding the relative technological backwardness of
countries with socialist economies).
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funding discrete adaptation projects and broader economic de-
velopment projects.
Mitigation cost estimates vary widely. Some analysts conclude
that full compliance with the Kyoto Protocol would generate net
social losses. 66 Others estimate that costs vary by more than an
order of magnitude because of large uncertainties concerning the
effects of climate change. For example, Christopher Mac-
Cracken and co-authors find that the cost of mitigating one ton
of carbon may be as low as $26 or as high as $250.67 However,
the costs of reducing GHG emissions may well be exaggerated.
Ex post analyses of regulatory costs reveal that ex ante cost esti-
mates often are inflated.68 Regulated industries have political in-
centives to exaggerate ex ante cost estimates as a strategy for
fighting proposed regulations. Even where good faith efforts are
made to provide accurate cost estimates, those estimates often
prove too high because, once regulations are in place, regulated
industries have incentives to minimize compliance costs through
technological innovations, materials substitution, or process
changes.
For evidence of how carbon mitigation can be accomplished at
reasonable cost, or even at a net benefit, consider the experience
of British Petroleum (BP), which managed to reduce its emis-
sions ten percent below 1990 levels in a very short period of time
merely by eliminating leaks and other sources of waste. Those
emissions reductions were obtained at a net cost of zero. In fact,
according to BP's former Chief Executive, Lord Browne, the
waste reductions increased shareholder value by about $650
million.69
Arguably, mitigation is a simpler, more manageable proposi-
tion for developed countries than aiding adaptation efforts in
LDCs. As we have seen, foreign aid is no panacea. There will be
resources wasted and some countries will simply refuse to be
66. See, e.g., William D. Nordhaus & Joseph G. Boyer, Requiem for Kyoto: An
Economic Analysis of the Kyoto Protocol, ENERGY J. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 131 (1999).
67. Christopher N. MacCracken et al., The Economics of the Kyoto Protocol,
ENERGY J. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 73 (1999). See also Carolyn Fischer & Richard D. Mor-
genstern, Carbon Abatement Costs: Why the Wide Range of Estimates? (Resources
for the Future, Discussion Paper No. 03-42, 2003).
68. See Winston Harrington, Richard D. Morgenstern, & Peter Nelson, On the
Accuracy of Regulatory Cost Estimates (Resources for the Future, Discussion Paper
No. 99-18, 1999).
69. See John Browne, Beyond Kyoto, 83 FOREIGN AFF. 20 (July/Aug. 2004), avail-
able at http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20040701faessay83404/john-brownelbeyond-
kyoto.html.
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helped. But, carefully targeted, tailored, and conditioned foreign
aid will enable at least some LDCs to improve living standards,
thereby offsetting some of the costs of climate change. We may
also hope for limited improvements to overall adaptive efficiency
in some LDC economies. At this point, that may be the most for
which we can reasonably hope.

